Book review: Antifragile: how to live in a world we don’tunderstand by Fuller, Steve
blo gs.lse.ac.uk
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2013/02/23/book-review-antifragile-how-to-live-in-a-world-we-dont-understand/
by Blog Admin February 23, 2013
Book Review: Antifragile: How to Live in a World We Don’t
Understand
In The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb wrote on the highly improbable and
unpredictable events that underlie almost everything about our world. In Antifragile, Taleb
aims to stand uncertainty on its head, making it desirable, even necessary. Steve
Fuller comments on the applicability of Taleb’s work to academia and discusses just how
‘fragile’ the academic way of being has become.
 
Antifragile: How to Live in a World We Don’t Understand. Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
Allen Lane. November 2012.
Find this book: 
Antifragile is the most inspiring work that I have read in a long time. It
provides a comprehensive rational basis f or the Nietzschean maxim,
‘What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger ’, which is the essence of  the
‘antif ragile’ world-view. Taleb generalises the lesson that he f irst taught
concerning ‘black swans’, namely, those highly improbable events that
when they happen end up producing a step change in the course of
history. Taleb’s deep insight involved a radical dismissal of  those who
claim in retrospect that they nearly predicted such events and think they
‘learn’ by improving their capacity to predict ‘similar events’ in the f uture.
Such people, who constitute an unhealthy proportion of  pundits in the
f inancial sector (but also a large part of  the social science community),
are captive to a hindsight illusion that leads them to conf use explanation
with prediction. The lesson they should learn is that prediction of  extreme
events is always a mug’s game. Rather, what matters is coming out
stronger regardless of  how one’s f uture predictions turn out.
The book is brimming with arguments, evidence and stories that are designed to appeal to a
broad range of  constituencies – f rom spreadsheet readers to Biblical exegetes. Some reviewers
have complained that the book should have been edited down f rom its sprawling 500-page
length. I do not share this view because the antif ragile world-view is quite elusive as a f ully developed
intellectual proposition. It needs to be articulated at several registers, without the expectation that any
particular reader will f ind all of  them equally persuasive (or, f or that matter, comprehensible); hence, the
book’s bagginess. Af ter all, it  is by no means obvious how to translate the intuit ive appeal of  Nietzsche’s
maxim into a strategy f or conducting one’s lif e — let alone f or making money, which has been the main
source of  Taleb’s mystique. (He had been a Wall Street trader who capitalised on market disasters.) In f act,
Nietzsche’s maxim is of ten interpreted as a personalised version of  the ‘survival of  the f ittest’ principle,
which would imply that being ‘stronger ’ is no more than a post hoc gloss on the mere f act that you have not
been killed – in this case, by Mother Nature. Nevertheless, Taleb insists that an acceptance of  Nietzsche’s
maxim still allows us to be smarter than this rationalisation supposes. But how exactly?
In Taleb’s presentation, antif ragility belongs to a tripartite distinction in world-views, roughly def ined in
terms of  how one deals with error or unwanted situations more generally. The ‘f ragile’ agent is one who
needs to control the environment in order to maintain its normal condition. A slight shif t in the environment
can result in devastating consequences. In contrast, the ‘robust’ agent maintains its normal condition in
response to changes in the environment. But an ‘antif ragile’ agent always maintains or improves its current
condition as the environment changes, without any preordained sense of  normality. A sense of  the
dif f erence between a ‘robust’ and an ‘antif ragile’ agent is captured by, on the one hand, a gambler who is
simply concerned with always being able to return to the casino no matter how his bets turn out and, on the
other, a gambler who always bets so that his losses can never outpace his wins, which generally means
placing a somewhat larger than expected bet on improbable events and a somewhat smaller than expected
bet on probable ones. The robust gambler does it as a hobby, the antif ragile one does it to make a living.
The key to the antif ragile mentality is what Taleb calls ‘optionality’, namely, the use of  degrees of  f reedom
as a proxy f or knowledge. In other words, if  you do not know what will happen, make sure you have every
option covered. Taleb, who appears to enjoy a ‘second lif e’ existence as a gangster, speaks in terms of
having ‘skin in the game’. In gambling circles, it is called ‘spread betting’. In any case, it is psychologically
much more dif f icult than it seems because so much of  our sense of  reality’s stability rests on the f uture
continuing the past being a ‘sure bet’. Why then waste time and money on outliers? But Taleb counsels that
it is better to run slightly behind the pack most of  the time by devoting a small but signif icant portion of
your resources to outliers, because when one of  them hits, the rewards will more than make up f or the
lower return that you had been receiving to date.
What is not so clear is whether Taleb’s advice would work if  everyone suddenly f ollowed it. (To be sure,
given the well-documented state of  statistical innumeracy across both ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ populations, this is
unlikely to happen soon.) My guess is that Taleb would stick with his advice based on his rather ‘realist’ view
of  how chance works. In this respect, he remains very much a man of  the classical world, where Tyche or
Fortuna is conceptualised as a goddess with a mind of  her own whose workings are in principle irreducible
to, say, the mutually calibrated judgements of  (typically male) market traders. Taleb does not believe that
the market can ever be tamed. He simply believes that you can f lourish in its wildness. While I personally do
not share Taleb’s pre-modern ontological commitments, given that mass statistical innumeracy is unlikely to
be relieved in the f oreseeable f uture, his call f or antif ragility is epistemologically very sound and leads to
some provocative conclusions about the organization of  knowledge.
As several reviewers have noted, Taleb instinctively dislikes prof essional academics, whom he dubs the
‘Fragilista’. Setting aside any interpersonal conf licts, Taleb is making a principled point about the potential
f or tenured appointments to def orm judgement. Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman can be wrong about the
economy’s perf ormance on a particular day and still retain their Ivy League chairs. This leads them to stress
supposed ‘long term’ tendencies in relation to which any given event may be treated as an ‘aberration’. To
be sure, should such tendencies come to be realized, they would take f ull credit – but without having
suf f ered any loss when they get things wrong. Taleb would have academics tie their judgements to a
signif icant portion of  their own wealth – so as to have ‘skin in the game’. He believes that they would then
behave in a more antif ragile manner, as economic punditry becomes a proper market.
As someone who has strongly def ended academic tenure as necessary to speak truth to power f reely, I am
struck by Taleb’s claim that tenure makes academics intellectually lazy. And it may well apply to
contemporary higher education. Tenure was originally designed to protect academics against government
censorship, not to make them immune to reality. Given that tenured academics – especially at the
prof essorial level — command quite high salaries, a case could be made that a portion of  such an
academic’s salary (perhaps up to 20%) might be set aside as investment money directly t ied to his or her
public pronouncements. (It could be seen as a somewhat more personalised version of  a research budget.)
This would be much more adventurous than the largely retrospective ‘impact’ f actor introduced to the UK’s
Research Excellence Framework. At the moment, academics are encouraged simply to promote ideas and
research that have worked in the past regardless of  their real-world relevance. Not surprisingly, any shif t in
the academic resource environment leads to cries of  bloody murder, but f or Taleb that just indicates how
‘f ragile’ the academic way of  being has become.
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